Anyone at #BuzzConf interested in adding permission scopes to token payments and drafting a standard? Hallway track with @mnemote & I tmz?
… but we never got around to actually having the conversation. My thoughts on the matter don’t conveniently fit into 140 character messages, so I thought I’d post them here instead …
You’ve probably noticed this when you go back to a site for another
purchase, and instead of the normal credit card form you get a little
Use Visa ending in ...1234? message … that’s how that works. The
site doesn’t know your full details, but it has remembered the existence
of your previous card in the form of a token which it can use to apply
for further payments.
The tokens can only be used by the merchant they were issued to, so unlike having your actual credit card numbers stolen there’s little risk they can be abused by a third party.
However, there’s no particular restriction beyond that. You can be under the impression that you’re paying once for a $5 micropayment, but that token can be kept for a lot longer and be billed for a lot larger amounts, without your knowledge or permission.
A responsible merchant would avoid this like crazy … credit card reversals are costly, relatively simple to arrange and would very rapidly put them out of business. But given the relatively lax environment of micropayments, there’s plenty of scope for abuse or at the very least nasty surprises. Fluctuating exchange rates, increases in usage and difficulties terminating contracts can all cause pain and confusion to the consumer.
And this pain can become pain to the vendor, if the customers do get cross enough to reverse payments. Or if an attacker gains access to the system and bills every token in the system $666.66, resulting in a flood of reversals.
I think what’s needed is some kind of policy mechanism. To create a token, the user passes not just the credit card numbers but also a policy document which describes the allowed use of the card. When a merchant goes to use a token, not only are the original card numbers retrieved but also the policy document, and it is checked against recent transactions.
For example, a policy document might specify that this merchant can only bill this card twice a month for up to $10 each time. Any more than that, the gateway will refuse the transaction and the payment will have to be performed with a new token (which can be obtained with the user’s specific approval)
This would work pretty easily in the open-an-iframe-to-the-gateway method, but how about for more modern sites which do a little AJAX dance instead? I’d argue that this is still a useful mechanism … sending a misleading policy is tantamount to fraud, and in the case of a bad actor at least the stored tokens will all be limited.
Including an explicit payment limitation policy in the credit card tokenization process would protect customers from dubious business practices and vendors from unnecessary reversals.
All we need to do now is standardize it …
We had a (brief) BoF about this at LCA 2016 and a few people will hopefully be collaborating on saferpayments.slack.com.
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